Baku government\u2019s claim is that there is no such discussion in the tripartite agreement in the form that Azerbaijan is proposing and trying to realize it with aggressive military, security and political policies in the last two years. What is proposed in the agreement of November 10, 2020, is the creation of a transport \u201croute of communication\u201d between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, including the unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles and goods, which is guaranteed by Armenia, and the control of transport by the FSB of Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Despite the explicit statement of paragraph 9 of the tripartite ceasefire agreement regarding the establishment of a \u201ccommunication route\u201d under the supervision of Russia, and despite the fact that in this paragraph there is no name of \u201ccorridor\u201d, \u201cchannel\u201d or \u201cpassage\u201d, as well as the exact cities and regions where the communication route passes and its \u201clength\u201d and \u201cwidth\u201d, we are still witnessing important challenging and controversial issues from Baku in this field.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
An important question that is raised here is why the government of Azerbaijan, contrary to the provisions of the 2020 agreement and the provisions of international law, still insists on reopening the alleged corridor of \u201cZangezor\u201d in an exclusive way?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Examining the developments of the last two years in the South Caucasus clearly shows that the government of Baku is pursuing interests in the alleged Zangezzor Corridor, with \u201cterritorial continuity\u201d at the top of them, but it should not be overlooked that, in addition to Baku, Turkey is the most important beneficiary of the construction of the aforementioned corridor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The current conflict in the South Caucasus is no longer over Nagorno-Karabakh and is not limited to Armenia and Azerbaijan, but has gained further dimensions and many players with strategic goals have entered it, Turkey being at the top because in recent years, the Turkish government has seriously placed the approach known as the \u201cTurkish World\u201d on the agenda of its foreign policy and seeks to form \u201cGreater Turkistan\u201d, so the main beneficiary of the creation of such a corridor is Turkey.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The most important function of the alleged Zangezzor Corridor, which is sometimes called the \u201cTurkistan Corridor\u201d, is to remove the biggest land and physical obstacle to the advancement of the Great Turkistan policy, which is related to Armenia and Sivnik province.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This is very important and dangerous from a strategic point of view, so that in 2020, in the midst of military conflicts between the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, \u201cIbrahim Karagol\u201d, the editor of \u201cYeni Shafaq\u201d newspaper, an unofficial organ of the ruling party of Turkey, wrote on his personal page:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cIran no longer has any border with Karabakh and should not be allowed to have a border with Armenia either; Nakhchivan should be connected to Azerbaijan and the road to Central Asia should be opened. Iran and Russia\u2019s unchanging doctrine of preventing the integration of the Turkic world must be ended!\u201d He also emphasized on his page, \u201cThe Karabakh war has just started and is considered the first step!\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, it is quite clear that the Karabakh conflict has practically become a \u201ccover\u201d for the advancement of strategic and long-term policies of some regional actors, which can lead to \u201cdangerous strategic consequences\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cChanging borders and geopolitics of the region\u201d is the most important consequence in this regard. If the Zangezor Corridor is built with the coordinates claimed by the Baku government, it will cut off Iran\u2019s communication lines with Armenia, and as a result, cut off one of Iran\u2019s important transit routes to Europe. Disruption in Iran\u2019s trade relations with Russia, Armenia and Georgia is another consequence of the alleged Zangezzor corridor. This issue will also reduce Iran\u2019s geopolitical advantage in the Caucasus and disrupt the balance of communication lines in the region, which is not acceptable in any way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The establishment of NATO in the South Caucasus and on the northern borders of Iran is another important consequence in this regard. According to the experiences of NATO\u2019s activities and functions, this issue will definitely cause \u201cweakening of the geopolitical order\u201d and \u201cexpansion of insecurity and instability\u201d in the South Caucasus in the long run, the waves of which will affect Azerbaijan in the first place. It is not without reason that in some political and media circles, the alleged corridor is also referred to as \u201cNATO\u2019s transfer corridor to the Caucasus\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In 2020, \u201cAdam Thomson\u201d, the former representative of the British government in NATO, published a statement addressed to the British Prime Minister and wrote, \u201cI request Mr. Prime Minister to use all his strength at this critical moment in history to take the last step to complete the 15 year project of NATO. \u201cLondon, with the participation of the United States and the European Union in the form of NATO, should support Azerbaijan\u2019s will to connect land to Nakhchivan!\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the Islamic Republic of Iran has a specific policy towards changing borders not only in the Caucasus, but in its surrounding environment. This is a \u201cstrategic issue\u201d for Iran to be sensitive to any change in borders or geopolitical and geographical structures in its surrounding environment and to show a serious and tough reaction;<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As seen in the issue of the Iraqi Kurdistan referendum, the Islamic Republic of Iran was against the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan and prevented it, and in the South Caucasus, the change of borders, which aggravates conflicts and disputes in the surrounding environment and creates security threats. It is \u201cunbearable\u201d foe Tehran and will not accept it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Baku government\u2019s claim is that there is no such discussion in the tripartite agreement in the form that Azerbaijan is proposing and trying to realize it with aggressive military, security and political policies in the last two years. What is proposed in the agreement of November 10, 2020, is the creation of a transport \u201croute […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":1025,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[124,128,129,127,7,126],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1024"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1024"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1024\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1026,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1024\/revisions\/1026"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1025"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1024"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1024"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.iras.ir\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1024"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}